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COMMENTS
INTERPRETATION OF INITIATIVES BY
REFERENCE TO SIMILAR STATUTES: CANONS
OF CONSTRUCTION DO NOT ADEQUATELY
MEASURE VOTER INTENT
It is common knowledge that an initiative measure is
originated by some organization or a small group of people
... that the measure is then placed on the ballot and a
large number of the population, not knowing what the
context of the act is, rely solely upon its title as a guide to
intelligent voting thereon.
- California Supreme Court, 19271
Generally, the drafters who frame an initiative and the
voters who enact it may be deemed to be aware of the judi-
cial construction of the law that served as its source.
- California Supreme Court, 19892
I. INTRODUCTION
Established in 1911, the California initiative process
sought to further public discussion of important issues, create
alternative solutions to public problems, and foster fuller par-
ticipation in public life.3 Today, however, it is unclear to
what extent the initiative process has succeeded in achieving
these noble goals.4
1. Wallace v. Zinman, 200 Cal. 585, 592, 254 P. 946, 949 (1927).
2. In re Harris, 49 Cal. 3d 131, 136, 775 P.2d 1057, 1060 (1989).
3. David Butler & Austin Ranney, Theory, in REFERENDUMS: A COMPARA-
TIVE STUDY OF PRACTICE AND THEORY 25-33 (David Butler & Austin Ranney
eds., 1978).
4. Signature drive deceptions, weakening of the legislature, infringement
on minority rights, the effect of money on success in an election, paid petition
circulators, and deceptive mail and advertising campaigns are all cited as major
shortcomings of direct democracy in California. THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DE-
MOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 207-19
(1989). Recently, the California Commission on Campaign Financing con-
ducted a two-year study on initiatives that produced 20 recommendations. CAL-
IFORNIA COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAP-
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One branch of government that has suffered from initia-
tive shortcomings is the judiciary. Subsequent to the enact-
ment of many initiatives, courts are burdened with tremen-
dous amounts of litigation due to ambiguity in initiative
language5 and constitutional challenges.' In turn, courts do
their best to "jealously guard" the public's right to the initia-
tive by interpreting initiatives to be consistent with the pub-
lic's desires.7 Yet, in the process of reviewing initiatives, Cal-
ifornia courts often overestimate voter knowledge of initiative
language by assuming that voters are aware of judicial inter-
ING CALIFORNIA'S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 19-30 (1992) [hereinafter
DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE]. Among the suggestions of the commission: (1) limit
initiatives to no more than 5,000 words; (2) require disclosure of financial con-
tributors on petitions, in advertisements and in a newly designed summary bal-
lot pamphlet; and (3) allow the legislature, with a 60% vote in each house, to
amend laws enacted by initiative. Id.
5. For instance, litigation required to resolve the ambiguities in the 1978
Proposition 13 continued well into the decade following its enactment. DEMOC-
RACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 4, at 82. Proposition 13 is not unique, as costly
litigation because of unclear initiative language is a major problem at the state
and county levels. Id. at 83 n.9.
6. Initiatives are subject to federal and state constitutional limitations ap-
plicable to all legislation. See Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley,
454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981). In addition, California courts must invalidate initia-
tives revising (rather than amending) the state Constitution; see CAL. CONST.
art. XVIII; Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 801 P.2d 1077 (1990); initia-
tives containing more than one subject must be struck down by the judiciary;
see CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d); see also infra text accompanying notes 89-95;
initiatives cannot conflict with any law higher than the statutory or constitu-
tional section amended; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 26; and finally, initiatives cannot
further any purpose prohibited by any of the subject matter limitations in the
California Constitution. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 12.
7. See Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equaliza-
tion, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 248, 583 P.2d 1281, 1302 (1978). Initiatives pose problems
for courts that are not present when reviewing ordinary legislation. On the one
hand, legislation enacted by initiative necessitates judicial activism because the
initiative lacks the benefit of bicameralism, executive veto, political parties, and
a legislative committee system that gives minorities bargaining power. See Ju-
lian N. Eule, Checking California's Plebiscite, 17 HAST. CONsT. L.Q. 151, 154
(1989). On the other hand, "one would hope that the courts will not fall prey to
the elitist argument that the people do not know what is best for them and
therefore need someone else to tell them." Donald S. Greenberg, The Scope of
the Initiative and Referendum in California, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1717, 1747
(1966). In addition to these pressures, judges are pressured with "the political
force of the electorate at large." Stephen R. Barnett, California Justice, 78 CAL.
L. REV. 247, 258 (1990) (quoting former California Supreme Court Justice
Charles Grodin). Former Justice Grodin states: "It is one thing for a court to
tell a legislature that a statute it has adopted is unconstitutional; to tell that to
the people of a state who have indicated their direct support for the measure...
is another." Id.
INTERPRETATION OF INITIATIVES
pretations of previous statutes that were the source of the ini-
tiative language.8 Consequently, the interpreting court views
the initiative in light of the existing law rather than inquir-
ing into the voter's understanding of the initiative language
and ballot argument.
This comment argues that the assumption of voter
knowledge of existing laws and their judicial constructions
weakens the initiative process.9 The background section ex-
amines the initiative process, the limited knowledge voters
have of the origins of the initiatives and of the initiative sub-
ject matter, and the willingness of California courts to use
existing statutes and their judicial construction to resolve
ambiguities in initiatives. 10 This comment uses the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's interpretation of the single-subject rule
as an example of judicial interpretation of an initiative by ref-
erence to a similar statute." The comment demonstrates
that voters generally have no exposure to the sources that
serve as the origin of the initiative's wording,' 2 that there is
no reasonable certainty the voters considered the judicial sig-
nificance of the borrowed words,' 3 and that the primary rea-
sons for utilizing canons of similar construction are not
served in the review of initiatives. 14 For the reasons set
forth, the comment proposes that California courts limit in-
terpretation of initiatives to materials officially presented to
the voters in the ballot pamphlet.' 5
II. BACKGROUND: THE INITIATIVE, THE VOTER, AND
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION BY REFERENCE TO
SIMILAR STATUTES
To fully comprehend the initiative process and judicial
review of initiatives, it is crucial to understand the modern-
day initiative process rather than the process imagined by its
original proponents. As is demonstrated in the materials be-
8. See infra text accompanying note 67-68.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 103-137.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 16-102.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 69-102.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 108-126.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 127-133.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 134-137.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 138-143.
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low, the initiative process is often intimidating to voters.16 In
addition, initiative drives are expensive and time-consuming,
and, as a result, are almost exclusively run by well-financed
interest groups. Thus, the initiatives may be voted on by the
public, but they generally are not a product of the average
citizen.
A. The Initiative Process
The initiative process has been characterized as a "legis-
lative battering ram"-a tool for the populace to enact legis-
lation ignored by elected representatives. 17 Lobbyist control
of Sacramento at the turn of the century prompted California
professionals and small businessmen to push the initiative
process as a means to give power back to the people.'" Ac-
cordingly, the initiative process was designed to allow grass-
roots access to law-making. Structurally, the process is rela-
tively unchanged from its original form of 1911.19
16. The 1990 election was described as "the most extensive and complicated
list of ballot propositions in the history of electoral politics-more and more
various items . . .than the Framers were asked to consider at the Constitu-
tional Convention." Election Excess, 1990-Style: The Issues and the Dangers,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1990, at B4. The November 1990 ballot was 222 pages in
length and would have taken the average voter 10 hours to read-excluding the
wording of the initiative measures. DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 4, at
15.
17. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
22 Cal. 3d 208, 228, 583 P.2d 1281, 1289 (1978).
18. Eugene C. Lee, California, in REFERENDUMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
PRACTICE AND THEORY, supra note 3, at 88. The Progressives, California's popu-
list political party, were primarily responsible for the movement of direct de-
mocracy against the Southern Pacific Railroad and other strong interest groups
in California. DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 4, at 38-40. Historians
generally agree that the Progressive's platform consisted of "[e]xpanding citizen
participation in politics (initiative, referendum, recall, and the replacement of
party nominating conventions with the direct primary); [tiaming unrestrained
corporate influence process ...; [p]rotecting the environment ... ; [and]
[i]mproving adverse living and working conditions." Id. at 38-39. Advocates
believed the initiative process would allow the poor and other minority groups
some access to the state legislative process. NANCY YOUNG, THE INITIATIVE PRO-
CESS IN CALIFORNIA 1 (1982). In addition, the initiative process would further
the goals of public discussion of important issues and consideration of alterna-
tive solutions to public problems. Butler & Ranney, supra note 3, at 24-33.
19. Between 1911 and 1922, 35 attempts were made to restrict the voter
right to the initiative. DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 4, at 44. Most
successful changes to the initiative process since 1911, however, were not aimed
at curbing a voter's right to direct democracy, but were "minor attempts to im-
prove the system or clarify omissions or inconsistencies in the law." Id. at 45.
INTERPRETATION OF INITIATIVES
A proposed initiative measure in California may be a
statutory or constitutional amendment, depending upon the
initiative's goal.2' If the initiative measure becomes law, the
relevant constitutional or statutory section is amended.2 2
Passed initiative measures are more difficult to amend than
regular legislation. An amendment or repeal of an initiative
is effective only when approved by a majority of voters in an
election.23 Therefore, because an enacted initiative may be
amended or repealed only by the voters, the measure is al-
most certain to be permanent unless a new initiative drive
and election is organized for amendment.
Thus, as designed, the initiative not only serves as a ve-
hicle for bypassing powerful interest groups, it also preserves
from legislative amendment law passed by initiative. Accord-
ingly, the initiative process should strengthen the populist
causes of citizen participation in politics and taming unre-
strained corporate influence. In reality, however, the initia-
tive process may not be a tool for the politically powerless,
but a tool for the well-financed and politically connected.
20. The direct and indirect initiatives were established via initiative in
1911. CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, HISTORY OF THE INITIA-
TWVE PROCESS IN CALIFORNIA 2 (1988) [hereinafter HISTORY OF INITIATIVE PRO-
CESS]. A direct initiative becomes law when a majority of the voting public ap-
proves it. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(a). The indirect initiative is approved by the
public and goes to the legislature for a vote before it becomes law. HISTORY OF
INITIATIVE PROCESS, supra, at 2. The indirect initiative was repealed in 1966,
and, as a result, all current initiatives are direct initiatives. Id.
21. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3524 (West 1993). For a measure to qualify for the
state ballot, a title and summary must be submitted to the Attorney General
and petitions circulated and signatures gathered from state residents. Id.
§ 3502. These petitions are then filed with the county clerk in the county where
signatures were collected. Id. § 3523. Signatures representing five percent of
the previous gubernatorial vote are required for a statutory revision and eight
percent are required for a constitutional amendment. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b).
22. The fact that initiatives do not undergo extensive scrutiny during the
law's formulation has led some to conclude that initiative proposals make bad
law. An initiative measure, unlike a piece of legislation, often contains extreme
views because drafters are not restrained by political considerations. See Nick
Brestoff, Note, The California Initiative Process: A Suggestion For Reform, 48 S.
CAL. L. REV. 922, 930-34 (1975). The initiative is typically written in complete
isolation by its proponent-not by an elected representative. Id. The propo-
nent often does not worry about satisfying constituents and never need worry
about re-election. Id. Unlike the legislative process, there is no opportunity for
public hearings on the law or for voter input. Id.
23. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c). The section provides that the Legislature
"may amend or repeal an initiative statute by another statute that becomes
effective only when approved by the electors." Id.
94919941
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The cost, the time, and the energy required to place an
initiative on the ballot are impractical for local grass-roots
movements.24 Petition circulation has become a multi-mil-
lion dollar business in California, with costs per signature
gathered for the 1990 campaign estimated at $1.21.25 Not
surprisingly, the high cost of seeing an initiative to the ballot
affects who sponsors initiatives.
Well-financed individuals, lobbyists, and special interest
groups proposed most of the initiatives for recent elections.26
Such a result is ironic, given the original goals of the initia-
tive process. Special interest groups have discovered cir-
24. In 1990, the average cost for an initiative to qualify for the ballot was
one million dollars. John Garamendi, Insurers Lost the Battle, but Won the
War, L.A. DAILY J., May 16, 1990, at 6. It is doubtful the average citizens' group
would be able to raise such a substantial sum. This problem does not seem to
be unique to the 1980's and 1990's. In 1966, Casper Weinberger, practicing law
in California, made the following observation:
The theory [behind the initiative process] was that people always
would be able to pass legislation they wished and needed if such legis-
lation had been denied to them by a legislature subservient to special
interests and pressure groups. As it has actually worked out, the the-
ory has actually failed ....
The costs of statewide elections being what they are, it is usually
only heavily financed pressure groups that can utilize the initiative to
secure passage of measures that no representative legislature would
dream of passing.
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF CAL., FINAL REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY INTERIM COM-
MITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 28-29 (1966) (emphasis added).
25. DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 4, at 267. This cost includes legal
assistance in drafting an initiative, signature-gathering costs, payments to peti-
tion circulation firms, direct mail costs, and other organizational expenses. Id.
at 267 n.7. Signature-gathering firms charge anywhere from twenty-five cents
to one dollar per signature. Lee, supra note 16, at 102.
26. DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSI-
TIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 199 (1984). Most initiative proposals do not
emerge from the electorate, but are part of the legislative strategy of the well-
financed. DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 4, at 265. "Any individual, cor-
poration, or organization with approximately $1 million to spend can now place
any issue on the ballot and at least have a chance of enacting a state law." Id.
The signature threshold requirement means that success is usually achieved by
hiring a professional signature-gathering firm. Id. Thus, persons or groups
without money will have little success in qualifying an initiative for election.
Id. For the most part, initiatives are funded by wealthy individuals, organiza-
tions, and corporations-individuals who likely have influence in Sacramento
despite the initiative drive. Id. at 279. For instance, in 1990, 67% of the total
dollars raised by all campaigns were received in amounts of $100,000 or more.
Id.
27. The influence of the Southern Pacific Railroad in Sacramento at the end
of the 19th Century mirrors the modern-day lock well-financed parties have on
the initiative process. A leading newspaper reporter in 1896 commented, "[ilt
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cumvention of an unresponsive legislature is easily achieved
by the initiative process. 28 As a result, the voter is left to
wade through the diverse desires of the interest group and
determine whether the entire initiative deserves a "yes" or
"no" vote.29  Enacted to empower the under-represented
members of society, it appears the initiative process now
serves the heavily financed interest groups the system was
hoping to bypass.
B. The Voter
Today, the vast majority of people work long hours, les-
sening their ability to fully consider issues on the ballot.30 In
didn't matter whether a man was Republican or Democrat. The Southern Pa-
cific Railroad controlled both parties, and he either had to stay out of the game
altogether or play it with the railroad." CHARLES G. BELL & CHARLES M. PRICE,
CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT TODAY: POLITICS OF REFORM 55 (3d ed. 1980). Popu-
list historians have argued that this stranglehold on the state government was
one reason the American economy almost collapsed in 1870. See DEMOCRACY BY
INITIATIVE, supra note 4, at 38. While the initiative process does not necessarily
pose such a threat, the resulting laws from initiatives may do more harm than
good.
28. See Vlae Kershner, Fewer Initiatives Expected in the Next Election, S.F.
CHRON., May 6, 1991, at Al, A12. The article contends that during Governor
Deukmejian's term, the Assembly and Governor were at an impasse. Id. at
A12. As a result, organized groups turned to the initiative process to get their
laws enacted. Id. Recent initiatives that support this contention are Proposi-
tion 13 in 1978 (property tax reform) and the $80 million automobile insurance
reform battle in 1988, both a result of the failure of the legislature to respond to
proposals. See DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 4, at 9.
29. The fact that complex issues presented in voter initiatives are decided
by a "yes" or "no" vote has resulted in criticism of the initiative as an indication
of public opinion rather than as contemplated law making. See Carol S. Hunt-
ing, Note, Pre-election Review of Voter Initiatives: American Fed'n of Labor-
Congress of Indus. Org. v. Eu, 60 WASH. L.REv. 911, 920 (1985).
30. With the increased number of initiatives, the voter has less time to
study each initiative. In the 1940's, 1950's, and 1960's, the average number of
initiatives on the ballot was 13. DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 4, at 55.
In the 1970's there were an average of 22 initiatives on the ballot. Id. The
1980's saw a boom, with an average of 46 initiatives presented to the voter. Id.
In 1990 alone, there were 18 initiatives on the ballot. Id.
The amount of time needed to study the large number of initiative meas-
ures arguably deprives the voters of the power to use their right intelligently.
Indeed, the first opponents of the initiative process believed the system to be
undemocratic because of the time it would take a voter to study ballot meas-
ures: "'This new method of handling the basic law of a state is advocated in the
name of democracy. In reality it is utterly and hopelessly undemocratic. While
pretending to give greater rights to the voters, it deprives them of the opportu-
nity effectively and intelligently to use their powers.'" Id. at 42 (quoting Edito-
rial, Anti-Democracy in California, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1911).
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addition, issues of politics are not of central concern to most
Californians.3 1 Thus, with the increase in the number of ini-
tiatives submitted to the electorate,32 voter frustration at
playing lawmaker is increasing. 33 There may not be much
frustration over having to decide whether legislators should
have term limits, but many feel it is not fair to ask voters how
the hearsay rule should be interpreted in California courts. 4
In addition, many voters complain of confusion due to
misleading3 5 and deceptive36 advertising campaigns.3 For
31. In a highly publicized campaign surrounding a controversial 1976 nu-
clear power initiative, voters were asked how much attention they had given
the campaign. See MAGLEBY, supra note 26, at 129. Almost one-fifth said they
had paid little attention to the news surrounding the debate. Id. The authors
of the study estimated that "between 10 and 33 percent of the voters were well
enough informed to make educated judgments" on the nuclear power initiative.
Id. at 140. In addition, a study also cited evidence that 14% of voters inter-
viewed had voted contrary to their stated intentions. CRONIN, supra note 4, at
74. Studies such as this have led commentators to believe that:
the vast majority of voters have no set opinions on most ballot ques-
tions and are usually unaware of the proposition until late in the cam-
paign .... [Ilt is reasonable to assume that 35 percent or more of those
who turn out [for an election] will not be aware of the less controversial
but more common propositions.
MAGLEBY, supra note 26, at 129.
32. See supra note 30.
33. Sentiment today seems to suggest that many topics covered by initia-
tive measures could be addressed at the legislative level. In the aftermath of
the unusually complicated 1990 measures, "it is pretty clear the public does not
want the future responsibility of voting on complex programs." Kershner,
supra note 28, at A12. This recent increase in ballot measures is quite a shift
from the electorate's original desire for the initiative process to serve as an al-
ternative to legislative law-making. The California special election ballot pam-
phlet proposing the initiative process stated the initiative would "supplement
the work of the legislature by initiating those measures which the legislature
either viciously or negligently fails or refuses to enact." DEMOCRACY BY INITIA-
TIVE, supra, note 4, at 53 (citing Arguments in Favor of SCA 22, in CALIFORNIA
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, SPECIAL ELECTION BALLOT PAMPHLET
(1911)).
34. See John Bulgar, Initiatives: Time for Reform?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27,
1990, at A22; see also Proposition 115, in CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
OF STATE, GENERAL ELECTION BALLOT PAMPHLET (1990). There may even be a
basis for believing voters are confused by initiatives surrounding the most prev-
alent issues of our day. In a 1991 Washington State campaign to codify the
decision in Roe v. Wade, the initiative passed by the "narrowest of margins ....
The measure was originally considered a shoo-in in the state, where abortion
rights guarantees date back to 1970 .... Supporters of the measure, Initiative
120, blamed the close finish on voter confusion about what the measure would
actually do." Abortion Rights Law Passes after Recount, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec.
15, 1991, at A13.
35. In 1988, one group opposed to a campaign finance reform initiative
(Proposition 68) targeted voters by suggesting in an advertisement that Nazi
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this reason, California has made a considerable effort to in-
form the voters by mailing, at government expense, a voter
pamphlet 38 describing all of the issues on the ballot.39 In the
pamphlet, proponents and opponents of the measure are
given equal space to debate the initiative's potential advan-
tages and drawbacks.4 °
storm troopers might receive public financing should the proposition pass. DE-
MOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 4, at 200. The initiative itself, however, in-
cluded multiple safeguards to protect public money from going to extremists.
Id.
36. In 1988, the tobacco industry aired one advertisement against a propo-
sition to raise cigarette taxes (Proposition 99) by claiming the tax would in-
crease the contraband sale of cigarettes. DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note
4, at 200. The profits from the illegal sale, argued the tobacco industry, would
in turn be used to buy guns, thereby forcing law enforcement officials to spend
extra time pursuing criminals. Id.
37. Advertisements rarely reach the actual content of an initiative mea-
sure. See Hunting, supra note 29, at 920 n.56 (relaying example of advertise-
ment against three initiative measures, "one for electronic rate reform, one for
handgun prohibition, and one to ban no-return beverage containers all marked
by industry sponsored ads opposing the initiatives by 'suggesting the enactment
of the measures would result in loss of jobs, manhood, and the opportunity to
grab gusto'") (citation omitted). The goal of those funding these advertisements
is winning the initiative election, not necessarily educating the voter regarding
the effects of an initiative. See Derrick A. Bell, The Referendum: Democracy's
Barrier To Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1, 20 (1978). Therefore, informa-
tion that helps the initiative campaign is released, and information that hurts
is likely suppressed. Id.
38. A 1990 survey of voters determined that 69% found information in the
ballot pamphlet helpful. DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 4, at 212. As a
source of information, it was second only to newspaper articles and analyses
(73%). Id. Of all the information a voter may use in evaluating an initiative,
however, the voter pamphlet is the only source a court may be sure the voter
has been exposed to. For instance, in the Los Angeles area, voter pamphlets are
mailed to 8 million people, whereas the L.A. TIMES reaches a maximum of 2.4
million people. Id. at 236.
39. The 1992 November ballot pamphlet contained 95 pages. CALIFORNIA
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, GENERAL ELECTION BALLOT PAMPHLET
(1992). The 1993 November ballot pamphlet for the special statewide election
contained 47 pages. CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, SPECIAL
STATEWIDE ELECTION BALLOT PAMPHLET (1993) [hereinafter 1993 CALIFORNIA
BALLOT PAMPHLET]. While this amount of information may be difficult for vot-
ers to digest, unlike the press or advertisements, the pamphlet offers an equal
forum for an initiative's debate.
40. The November 1993 ballot pamphlet briefly summarized the measures
on the ballot. 1993 CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 39, at 4-7. The
pamphlet also contained an analysis of the ballot measure by the Legislative
Analyst and the ballot arguments by the measure's proponents and opponents.
Id. at 8-37. The last seven pages of the pamphlet were devoted to the language
of the ballot measures themselves. Id.
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Unfortunately, the ability to inform the public has not
been as successful as hoped.41 Characterized by one political
scientist as "impenetrable prose," one analysis in California
concluded that "[i]n highly contested proposition elections,
the pamphlet ranks well behind television, newspapers and
often the radio as a source of information . . . indicat[ing]
that most of the voters do not read the pamphlet or use it as a
source . . . for decisions on propositions."42 In comparison,
legislators spend weeks in committee reviewing laws and de-
bating the impact they will have on citizens, leaving behind a
clear record of their intent and decision-making process.43
Thus, many voters do not take considerable time to study
the ballot arguments and summaries in a ballot measure, and
even fewer take time to read the language of a proposed initi-
ative. When ambiguities arise in an initiative's interpreta-
tion, there is some question as to which sources the court
should examine to determine the intent of the enacting body.
With this in mind, the next section explores the judicial ap-
proach to interpreting the intent of the enacting body of an
initiative.
41. A study on the 1990 ballot pamphlet indicated that the equivalent of
three or four years of college education was needed to understand its parts.
DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 4, at 241. This is despite legal obligations
to write in "clear and concise terms." Id. at 238 (citations omitted). Indeed,
there is no telling what level of expertise is needed to understand some of the
actual initiative language. However, some voter confusion may be present due
to lack of interest. For example, only twenty days before the 1992 election,
fewer than four in ten voters in California had heard of three measures which,
if enacted, would have had a "profound effect" on future California law. Vlae
Kershner, Poll Finds Few Voters Familiar with State Budget Measures, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 14, 1992, at A6. Thirty-nine percent of the voters questioned said
they had heard of Proposition 165, Governor Wilson's budget and welfare initia-
tive. Id. Twenty-three percent of voters had heard of Proposition 167, a "tax the
rich" initiative. Id. Proposition 163, a repeal of a sales tax on snack food, also
suffered from poor exposure. Id.
42. CRONIN, supra note 4, at 82. A noted California politician comments
that "[slixty second commercials may be entertaining, but they shouldn't form
the basis for policy decisions. If immensely complicated issues could be easily
whittled down to four lines and a yes-or-no answer, there would be no need for a
legislature." Garamendi, supra note 24, at 6. But see supra note 38 (1990 sur-
vey indicated that 69% of voters find the ballot pamphlet a helpful source).
43. See Schmitz v. Younger, 21 Cal. 3d 90, 99, 577 P.2d 652, 657 (1978)
(Manuel, J., dissenting).
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C. Judicial Interpretation of Intent in Initiative Measures
Today's voter faces dozens of initiatives containing multi-
ple provisions. 44 These initiatives purport to create a pack-
age of reforms that will further an object. Often, the initia-
tives contain huge amounts of ambiguous terminology.45
Thus, a reviewing court faces a tough task in divining the
meaning of initiatives.
"[T]he cardinal rule" of statutory interpretation in Cali-
fornia is that "the statute is to be construed so as to give ef-
fect to the intent of the law makers."46 Therefore, "[in con-
struing constitutional and statutory provisions, whether
enacted by the legislature or by initiative, the intent of the
enacting body is the paramount consideration."47 When am-
biguity arises in the language of an initiative measure, courts
in California often turn to ballot summaries and arguments
to determine the intent of the voters and to understand the
meaning of the ballot measure. 48 "As such, they may prop-
44. In the 1988 and 1990 elections, voters were faced with 13 initiatives
over 5,000 words long. DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 4, at 85. In 1990,
Proposition 129 ("Big Green" Initiative) was 13,665 words; Proposition 130
("Forests Forever" Initiative) was 10,838 words; Proposition 131 (Campaign Fi-
nance Initiative) was 15,633 words; and Proposition 138 (Timber Harvesting
Initiative) was 9,735 words. Id. at 86.
45. For instance, in 1978, the governor's office determined that Proposition
13 (Property Tax Reform Initiative), which was exposed to great scrutiny in the
months before the election, contained at least 40 ambiguities in the language.
DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIvE, supra note 4, at 81 (citing LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOT-
ERS, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA: A LEGACY LOST? 40 (1984)).
These ambiguities often result because initiatives are drafted out of the public
eye. See supra note 21.
46. Mercer v. Perez, 68 Cal. 2d 104, 112, 436 P.2d 315, 318 (1968).
47. In re Lance, 37 Cal. 3d 873, 889, 694 P.2d 744, 753 (1985) (emphasis
added). See also Yoshisato v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 978, 989, 831 P.2d 327,
329 (1992); Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 505, 816 P.2d 1309, 1316 (1991);
Whitman v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 1063, 1072, 820 P.2d 262, 266 (1991);
Sanford v. Garamendi, 233 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 1118, 284 Cal. Rptr. 897 (Ct.
App. 1991); In re Quinn, 35 Cal. App. 3d 473, 483, 110 Cal. Rptr. 881 (Ct. App.
1973).
48. See, e.g., Yoshisato, 2 Cal. 4th at 982, 831 P.2d at 329; Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at
504, 816 P.2d at 1315; Taxpayers v. Fair Political Practices Comm., 51 Cal. 3d
744, 749 n.5, 799 P.2d 1220, 1223 n.5 (1990); Lungren v. Deukmejian, 45 Cal.
3d 727, 739-40, 755 P.2d 299, 307 (1988); White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 775,
533 P.2d 222, 233 (1975); People v. Knowles, 35 Cal. 2d 175, 182, 217 P.2d 1, 5
(1950).
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erly be resorted to as a construction aid to determine the
'probable meaning of uncertain language.' "49
The official ballot materials are reliable because they are
presented to the voter,50 whereas courts are reluctant to con-
sult materials not officially presented to the electorate when
interpreting a statute.51 Presumably, the court is reluctant
to include material not presented to the voter in its analysis
of an initiative because the enacting body did not consider the
materials when formulating its interpretation of the initia-
tive.52 Yet, California courts have indicated no such concern
when interpreting initiatives by reference to similar statutes.
1. Canons of Similar Construction: Discovering Intent
By Reference to Similar Statutes
When interpreting initiatives, the California courts have
drawn upon similar statutes to determine the intent of am-
biguous words.53 This method of interpretation uses the
49. Board of Supervisors v. Lonergan, 27 Cal. 3d 855, 866, 616 P.2d 802,
808 (1980). See also Carter v. Seaboard Fin. Co., 33 Cal. 2d 564, 580-81, 203
P.2d 758, 769 (1949). A recent California Supreme Court case indicates that
ballot arguments may be viewed by the current court as only somewhat helpful:
"Ballot arguments often embody the sound-bite rhetoric of competing political
interests vying for public support. However useful they may be in identifying
the general evils sought to be remedied by an initiative measure, they are prin-
cipally designed to win votes, not to present a thoughtful or precise explication
of legal tests or standards." Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 7 Cal.
4th 1, 22 n.5, 865 P.2d 633, 646 n.5 (1994).
50. The voter pamphlet is mailed to every citizen registered to vote. Other
sources, such as newspapers and advertisements, are likely to have some public
exposure, but there is no certainty they are presented to all the voters. See
supra note 38.
51. See, e.g., Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Prac-
tices Comm., 51 Cal. 3d 744, 764, 799 P.2d 1220, 1232 (1990) (rejecting the
motive and purpose of the drafters of an initiative as irrelevant to its construc-
tion for a lack of reason to conclude that the body that adopted the statute was
aware of that purpose). Other cases rejecting the opinion of the legislators and
drafters of initiatives to interpret ambiguous language include: Lungren, 45
Cal. 3d at 743, 755 P.2d at 309; People v. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d 301, 311-12, 696
P.2d 111, 116 (1985); City of San Francisco v. Farell, 32 Cal. 3d 47, 52, 648 P.2d
935, 937 (1982). Courts relying on materials presented in the voter pamphlet
include: Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equaliza-
tion, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 242-44, 583 P.2d 1281, 1298, 1300 (1978) (using title and
summary of purpose in initiative as described in voter pamphlet); Carter, 33
Cal. 2d at 580-81, 203 P.2d at 769 (using summary of Attorney General in voter
pamphlet).
52. See Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending, 51 Cal. 3d at 764 n.10, 799
P.2d at 1232 n.10.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 67-68.
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words and judicial constructions of a statute from its own ju-
risdiction or another jurisdiction to resolve ambiguous lan-
guage in initiatives.
a. In Pari Materia: Intra-Jurisdictional
Interpretations
"'Statutes in pari materia' are those relating to the same
person or thing or having a common purpose."54 Thus, where
a statute from the same jurisdiction was interpreted previ-
ously by a court, a subsequent statute on the same subject
will be harmonized with that interpretation.5 This inclina-
tion "is based on the common-sense assumption that when
the legislature enacted statutes on the same topic, it most
likely intended that they be consistent with each other even
though the statutes contain no reference to each other."
5 6
This canon of construction presumes enactments from
the same jurisdiction are considered part of the same uniform
system.5 7 The canon rests on the assumption that the legisla-
tive body contemplated the existing legislation on the same
subject at the passage of the new act.58 Here, the "critical
question concerns how reasonable it is to assume that legisla-
tors and members of the public know the provisions of other
acts on the same subject when they consider the meaning of
the act to be construed."59 Thus, the assumption of the legis-
54. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 711 (5th ed. 1979). For application in Califor-
nia, see, e.g., Kizer v. Hanna, 48 Cal. 3d 1, 767 P.2d 679 (1989); Long Beach
Officers Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 46 Cal. 3d 736, 759 P.2d 504 (1988); People
v. Woodhead, 43 Cal. 3d 1002, 741 P.2d 154 (1987); International Business
Mach. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 26 Cal. 3d 923, 609 P.2d 1 (1980); People v.
Caudillo, 21 Cal. 3d 562, 580 P.2d 274 (1978); Lawler v. City of Redding, 7 Cal.
App. 4th 778, 9 Cal. Rptr.2d 392 (Ct. App. 1992); Clubs of Cal. for Fair Competi-
tion v. Kroger, 7 Cal. App. 4th 709, 9 Cal. Rptr.2d 247 (Ct. App. 1992); In re
Jason V., 229 Cal. App. 3d 1168, 280 Cal. Rptr. 562 (Ct. App. 1991).
55. Application of the rule is most justified when statutes of the same sub-
ject matter are passed in the same legislature. See International Business
Mach., 26 Cal. 3d at 923, 601 P.2d at 1; Caudillo, 21 Cal. 3d at 562, 580 P.2d at
274.
56. WILLIAM P. STATSKY, LEGISLATWVE ANALYSIS AND DRAFTING 93-94 (1984).
57. See HENRY C. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRE-
TATION OF THE LAWS 332 (1911).
58. Id. at 233.
59. 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.01, at 450 (4th ed.
1973) (emphasis added) [hereinafter SUTHERLAND]. In pari materia rests on the
premise that "when a legislature enacts a provision, it has available all the
other provisions relating to the same subject matter whether in the same stat-
ute or in a separate act." Id.
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lative knowledge of the previous statute is of particular con-
cern when applying the canon.
Another policy consideration of the canon is that the leg-
islature seeks to promote the uniformity of law.6" Thus, the
interpretation of the second statute "shall be such, if possible,
as to avoid repugnancy or inconsistency between different en-
actments of the same legislature."61 This commonly occurs
when words from a previous statute are added to the subse-
quent statute:
For example, when the legislature has used a word in a
statute in one sense and with one meaning, and subse-
quently uses the same word in legislating on the same
subject-matter, it will be understood as using the word in
the same sense, unless there is something in the context or
in the nature of things to indicate it intended a different
meaning thereby.62
b. Statutes Adopted From Other Jurisdictions
Where the legislature of one jurisdiction adopts a provi-
sion, clause, or phrase from a statute of another jurisdiction,
it is presumed that the enactment was made with knowledge
of the prior interpretation and that the legislature intends for
the court to apply the new language with a similar interpre-
tation.63 This canon of interpretation "rests altogether on the
presumption that the legislature, in deliberating upon the
adoption of the statute, had before it not only the terms of the
law itself, but also the judicial decisions in which it had been
interpreted, and, moreover, it must be supported by a pre-
sumption that such interpretation was regarded by the legis-
lature as definite, clear and established."64 Likewise, where
the legislature makes a material change in the borrowed lan-
60. See BLACK, supra note 57, at 333.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 333-34 (emphasis added). A different "context" or "nature" may
be when a "new statute embod[ies] policies or compromises subtly different
from those in the similar statute." WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY,
LEGISLATION, STATUTES, AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 786 (1988).
63. See BLACK, supra note 57, at 597.
64. Id. at 598-99. See also Associated Truck Parts, Inc. v. Superior Court,
278 Cal. App. 3d 864, 279 Cal. Rptr. 76 (Ct. App. 1991) (stating that legislature
is presumed to have been fully aware of the judicial construction of the statute
and intended to alter the law).
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guage, the court must assume the legislature did not intend
to adopt the interpretation.6
Therefore, it is clear that when legislators adopt lan-
guage of earlier statutes in new laws, the courts correctly in-
terpret the new law consistently with the prior statute be-
cause it is plausible to assume that (1) the legislature acted
with knowledge of the previous law, and (2) the legislature
desires uniformity unless otherwise stated.
2. California Courts, Initiatives, and Reference to
Similar Statutes
Despite the fact that statutory canons are often objected
to because there is no guarantee a legislator was aware of the
canon used to interpret the statute,66 California courts as-
sume voter knowledge of existing laws and constructions
when interpreting initiatives by applying canons of similar
construction.6 7 The California Supreme Court has repeatedly
stated that "[w]here the language of a statute uses terms that
have been judicially construed, 'the presumption is almost ir-
resistible' that the terms have been used 'in the precise and
technical sense which had been placed on them by the courts'
.... This principle applies to legislation adopted through the
initiative process." 68
65. BLACK, supra note 57, at 601. See also Committee of Seven Thousand v.
Superior Court, 45 Cal. 3d 491, 754 P.2d 708 (1988); Lawler v. City of Redding,
7 Cal. App. 4th 778, 9 Cal. Rptr.2d 392 (Ct. App. 1992).
66. A prominent jurist and legal scholar criticizes canons of construction for
the following reason:
Most canons of statutory construction go wrong not because they mis-
conceive the nature of a judicial interpretation or of legislative or polit-
ical process but because they impute omniscience to [the enacting
body]. Omniscience is always an unrealistic assumption, and particu-
larly so when one is dealing with the legislative process.
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation in the Classroom and in the Court-
room, 50 U. CHI L. REV. 800, 811 (1983). Besides the criticism that statutory
canons presume legislative omniscience, canons are often criticized because the
thrust of one canon is easily rebutted by another. See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION 521-35 (1960) (providing a list of canons of construc-
tion that conflict directly with one another).
67. See, e.g., Hobbes v. Municipal Court, 233 Cal. App. 3d 670, 284 Cal.
Rptr. 655 (Ct. App. 1991) (stating the body enacting the initiative is deemed to
be aware of existing laws and judicial constructions in effect at the time legisla-
tion is enacted).
68. People v. Weidert, 39 Cal. 3d 836, 845-46, 705 P.2d 380, 385 (1985) (ci-
tations omitted). See also In re Harris, 49 Cal. 3d 131, 136, 775 P.2d 1057, 1060
(1989) (stating that drafters of the language of Penal Code § 667 used the lan-
guage "on charges brought and tried separately" as a derivation of the old Penal
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This judicial assumption appears to have its origins in
the interpretation of a hotly contested initiative issue-the
single-subject rule.69 The single-subject rule has engendered
considerable controversy over its proper enforcement. 70 Per-
haps the genesis of this debate is the judicial assumption that
the voters knew of existing statutes and their judicial con-
struction when voting for the single-subject rule.71
The following discussion traces the reasons for the as-
sumption of voter knowledge of an existing law in the initial
interpretation of the initiative single-subject rule. The dis-
cussion is useful for illustrating the problems of assuming
voter knowledge of existing laws and interpretations where
little evidence to do so is present.
Code § 644 language "upon charges separately brought and tried" and therefore
a presumption of the same meaning of the prior phrase should be applied); In re
Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 889, 694 P.2d 744, 754 (1985) (stating that the electo-
rate is presumed to be aware of a similar construction of a legislative statute
when interpreting ambiguous terms of Proposition 8); In re Jeanice D., 28 Cal.
3d 210, 216, 617 P.2d 1087, 1089-90 (1980) (interpreting language "25 years to
life" in Penal Code § 190 as enacted by voters in November 1978 with the aid of
a prior statute enacted by the legislature); Robert S. v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.
App. 4th 1417, 1421, 12 Cal. Rptr.2d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 1992) (deeming the
electorate to be aware of Welf. & Inst. Code § 203, which states a proceeding in
juvenile court is not a criminal proceeding when interpreting definition of
"criminal proceeding" in Proposition 115).
69. See Perry v. Jordan, 34 Cal. 2d 87, 207 P.2d 47 (1949). For a discussion
of judicial review under the California single-subject rule see, Marilyn E.
Minger, Comment, Putting the "Single" Back In the Single-Subject Rule: A Pro-
posal for Initiative Reform in California, 24 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 879 (1991);
Daniel Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single-Subject Rule, 30 UCLA
L. REV. 936 (1983); Steven W. Ray, Comment, The California Initiative Process:
The Demise of the Single-Subject Rule, 14 PAC. L.J. 1095 (1983).
70. Over the last 15 years, the California Supreme Court has debated how
the single-subject rule should be enforced. See, e.g., Amador Valley Joint Union
High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281
(1978); Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274 (1982). Propositions
that have recently satisfied challenges under the rule include: Proposition 140
in Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 245, 816 P.2d 1309 (1991) (allowing term limits,
budget limits, and pension limits under the subject of "incumbency reform");
Proposition 115 in Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 53 Cal.
3d 245, 806 P.2d 1360 (1991) (allowing health education programs, tobacco-re-
lated disease research, and programs for fire prevention under the subject of
"tobacco tax"); Proposition 115 in Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 801
P.2d 1077 (1990) (allowing initiative covering post-indictment hearings, consti-
tutional independence, joinder and severance rules, hearsay testimony, discov-
ery procedures, and others under "Crime Victim Rights").
71. See infra text accompanying notes 95-102.
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a. The Single-Subject Rule-California Courts
and Reference to Similar Statutes
In California, there are two single-subject rules, one for
the legislative process and one for the initiative process. The
single-subject rule as a limit to legislation was adopted in
1849.72 It is codified in Article IV, § 9 of the California Con-
stitution and states in relevant part:
A statute shall embrace but one subject which shall be ex-
pressed in its title. If a statute embraces a subject not
expressed in its title, only the part not expressed is void.
A statute may not be amended by reference to its title. A
section of a statute may not be amended unless the sec-
tion is reenacted as amended.73
The single-subject rule as a limit on initiatives was en-
acted as "Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 2" in the
1948 election. 4 It is now codified in Article IV, § 8(d) of the
California Constitution and states that "an initiative embrac-
ing more than one subject may not be submitted to the voters
or have any effect."7
5
In California, both the legislative single-subject rule and
the initiative single-subject rule are interpreted and enforced
by the judiciary.
1) The Legislative Single-Subject Rule
For centuries, the single-subject rule has been a limit on
the ability of legislatures to pass laws with more than one
subject.76 The primary purpose of the legislative single-sub-
72. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 25.
73. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 9. An amendment providing an exception for
budget act appropriations was rejected by statewide election on November 2,
1993. Id.
74. See CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE, BALLOT PAMPHLET 8
(1948) [hereinafter 1948 BALLOT PAMPHLET].
75. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d). As proposed, the initiative single-subject
rule was similar to the rule today, although considerably more wordy:
Every constitutional amendment or statute proposed by the initiative
shall relate to but one subject. No such amendment or statute shall be
submitted to the electors if it embraces more than one subject, nor
shall any such amendment or statute embracing more than one sub-
ject, hereafter submitted to or approved by the electors, become effec-
tive for any purpose.
1948 BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 74, at 17.
76. See Milliard H. Ruud, No Law Shall Embrace More than One Subject,
42 MINN. L. REV. 389, 389 (1958). The single-subject rule originated in Rome
where the enactment of the Lex Caelcilia Didia prohibited laws containing un-
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ject rule is recognized as the prevention of log-rolling, "the
practice of several minorities combining their legislative pro-
posals as different provisions of a single bill and thus consoli-
dating their votes so that a majority is obtained."77 Addi-
tional purposes of the legislative single-subject rule are the
preservation of an orderly legislative process and the preven-
tion of deception of the legislature and the public.7" Single-
subject legislation promotes clarity in the legislative process
and ensures there will be little confusion due to multi-subject
bills.79
The seminal case on the California Supreme Court's ap-
plication of the legislative single-subject rule is Evans v. Su-
perior Court.8 0 In Evans, the court determined that legisla-
tion may include any provision as long as all parts of the
legislation are "reasonably germane."" The Evans test is a
"liberal" standard of review. 2 The main rationale for liberal
application of the single subject rule to legislation is the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's reluctance to impinge upon the state
legislature's prerogative.8 3 To determine whether an act con-
tains a single subject that is sufficiently referred to in its ti-
tle, "the court [is] permitted to look at the history of the par-
ticular legislation to which the act relates when read as a
whole." 4 The history of the bill indicates to the court that
the bill is legitimate legislation. 5 When determining
whether the parts of a legislative enactment are reasonably
germane, a court need not find substantial evidence of a sin-
gle-subject bill. As the Evans court noted, the single-subject
rule "was not enacted to provide a means for the overthrow of
legitimate legislation."8 6
related provisions. Id. Today, this limit on omnibus legislation exists in most
of the nation's states. MAGLEBY, supra note 26, at 201.
77. Ruud, supra note 77, at 391. See also, Planned Parenthood Affiliates v.
Swoap, 173 Cal. App. 3d 1187, 1196, 219 Cal. Rptr. 664, 668 (Ct. App. 1985).
78. See Ruud, supra note 77, at 391.
79. Id.
80. 215 Cal. 58, 8 P.2d 467 (1932).
81. 215 Cal. at 62; 8 P.2d at 469.
82. Id.
83. 215 Cal. at 62, 8 P.2d at 470.
84. 215 Cal. at 62, 8 P.2d at 469.
85. Evans v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. 58, 62, 8 P.2d 467, 470 (1932). Legiti-
mate legislation is legislation whose subjects are sufficiently referred to in the
title so as not to mislead legislators and the public. Id.
86. 215 Cal. at 62, 8 P.2d at 469.
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The attitude of judicial restraint exercised by the Evans
court makes perfect sense in light of the educated nature of
the representatives and the extensive amount of scrutiny
given a piece of legislation before a vote. Thus, the California
Supreme Court's approach to the legislative single-subject
rule is wary of "judicial interference with legislative action
... so as not to hamper the legislature nor embarrass honest
legislation."8 7
b) The Initiative Single-Subject Rule
In 1948, the California Constitution was amended to
limit initiatives to a single subject.8 8 This amendment was
enacted through the initiative process in order "to eliminate
the danger of voter confusion and deception."8 9 In the 1948
ballot summary, the advocates of the single-subject rule rea-
soned that the "purposes to be achieved by the enactment
were: (1) Simplification and clarification of the issues
presented to the voters; and (2) A more intelligent amend-
ment of the constitution by permitting the adopted sections to
be placed in the appropriate subdivision of the constitu-
tion."90 The advocates further reasoned:
The busy voter does not have the time to devote to the
study of long, wordy propositions and must rely upon such
sketchy information as may be received through the press,
radio, or picked up in general conversation. If improper
emphasis is placed upon one feature of the initiative and
the remaining features [of the initiative] ignored, or if
there is a failure to study the entire proposed amendment,
the voter may be misled as to the overall effect of the pro-
posed amendment. 9 '
In response, the opponents of the single-subject initiative
argued that the single-subject rule was "an attempt to invade
the fundamental principles of the initiative .... After all,
what consists of one subject? Is 'taxation', or 'education', or
87. Ruud, supra note 77, at 393-94.
88. "Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 2" of the 1948 election was
the title of the single-subject rule initiative. See 1948 BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra
note 74, at 8. There are six states where the single-subject rule limits initia-
tives. See DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 4, at 312.
89. Schmitz v. Younger, 21 Cal. 3d 90, 97, 577 P.2d 652, 656 (1978) (Ma-
nuel, J., dissenting).
90. 1948 BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 74, at 8.
91. Id.
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'social welfare', one or more than one subject?"9 2 Nowhere in
the ballot argument, ballot summary, or the text of the initia-
tive was the legislative single-subject rule mentioned.
The single-subject rule was approved by the electorate by
a vote of 1,973,761 to 963,387, an overwhelming majority.93
If the language of the ballot argument is any indication, those
who voted in favor of the rule were concerned with long and
complex measures for which they were unable to weigh the
long-term implications. 94 There was no mention of the legis-
lative single-subject rule or its "liberal" review under Evans,
thereby indicating a fresh analysis by the California Supreme
Court was appropriate.
Seven months after the single-subject rule for initiatives
was passed, however, the California Supreme Court held in
Perry v. Jordan95 that the "[single-subject] provision is not to
receive a narrow or technical construction in all cases, but is
to be construed liberally to uphold proper legislation, all
parts of which are reasonably germane."96 Thus, the inter-
pretation of the initiative single-subject rule was the same in-
terpretation the California Supreme Court gave the legisla-
tive single-subject rule in Evans. The basis for the
application of the interpretation handed down in Evans
rested on "an indication" that if words and phrases are used
in a subsequent statute in a similar setting, then the subse-
92. Id. at 9.
93. CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, A STUDY OF BALLOT
MEASURES 1894-1980 22 (1982).
94. A common tactic prior to the enactment of the initiative single-subject
rule was to create omnibus measures with the hope that one issue or the issues
combined could ride the measure to victory. Lowenstein, supra note 69, at 950.
One of the most interesting groups was the "Ham and Eggs" coalition that pro-
posed a "monstrous" measure under the title of "California Bill of Rights" in
1938, 1939, 1940, and 1944. See WINSTON W. CROUCH, THE INITIATnWE AND REF.
ERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA 8 (1950). Included in this proposition were 12 sections
and 12,000 words dealing with such subjects as pensions, taxes, gambling, Indi-
ans, and Senate Reapportionment. Id. at 9. None of the initiatives passed, but
the public was clearly frustrated with the pattern of multi-subject initiatives.
See Lowenstein, supra note 69, at 950-52. The drafting of the single-subject
rule for initiatives was a direct response to these catch-all initiatives. Id.
95. 34 Cal. 2d 87, 207 P.2d 47 (1949). The plaintiffs in Perry contended that
an initiative measure for the repeal of pensions for the needy, aged, and blind
was in violation of the single-subject rule. Perry, 34 Cal. 2d at 89-90, 207 P.2d
at 48-49.
96. Perry, 34 Cal. 2d at 92, 207 P.2d at 50 (quoting Evans v. Superior Court,
215 Cal. 58, 62, 8 P.2d 467, 469 (1932)).
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quent statute carries with it a like interpretation.97 The
court stated that nothing in the argument to the voters led
them to believe a different construction was necessary.98 The
court did not discuss that the legislative single-subject rule
was never exposed to the public for consideration. The court
also failed to consider that the voters might desire less defer-
ence than the legislature99 or might have intended a stricter
inquiry.100 Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court
adopted the Evans "liberal" review based on the assumption
that the initiative single-subject rule intended to adopt the
legislative single-subject rule's interpretation. 10 1
97. Id.
98. Id. Contrary to the court's suggestion, there is significant difference in
the statute's wording. See infra text accompanying notes 113-126.
99. It is surprising the court chose this adaptation, because the main ra-
tionale for the liberal review was the court's reluctance to infringe upon the
legislature's prerogative. See supra text accompanying notes 80-88.
100. Consider Wallace v. Zinman, 200 Cal. 585, 254 P. 946 (1927), where the
California Supreme Court recognized the dangers associated with complex laws
before the electorate. Wallace involved a challenge to an initiative measure as
violating the legislative single-subject rule. Wallace, 200 Cal. at 590, 254 P. at
947. The court lectured that "[the majority of qualified electors are so much
interested in managing their own affairs that they have no time to carefully
consider measures affecting the general public." Wallace, 200 Cal. at 592, 254
P. at 949 (citing State v. Richardson, 85 P. 225, 229 (Or. 1906). The court
continued:
[tihe greater number of voters.., usually derive their knowledge of the
contents of a proposed law from an inspection of its title thereof, which
is sometimes secured only from the very meager details afforded by a
ballot which is examined in an election booth preparatory to exercising
the right of suffrage.
Wallace, 200 Cal. at 592-93, 254 P. at 949. Therefore, the Wallace court con-
cluded, this limited knowledge necessitates that initiative measures "strictly
comply" with the constitutional requirement of a single subject. Wallace, 200
Cal. at 593, 254 P. at 949. Using the analysis employed by the Perry court, it is
possible to assume that the voters knew of Wallace and desired strict compli-
ance with the initiative single-subject rule. See infra text accompanying notes
130-133.
101. Since the Perry decision, the court has repeatedly applied the "reason-
ably germane" test to determine whether an initiative violates the single-sub-
ject rule. The test has received much criticism. See supra notes 69-70.
In the past 15 years, the California Supreme Court has upheld initiatives
challenged by the single-subject rule in some noteworthy cases. See, e.g., Legis-
lature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 816 P.2d 1309 (1991) (upholding incumbency re-
form initiative, Proposition 140 on June 1991 primary election ballot); Kennedy
Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 53 Cal. 3d 245, 806 P.2d 1360
(1991) (upholding tobacco tax initiative, Proposition 99 on November 1988 elec-
tion ballot); Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 801 P.2d 1077 (1990) (up-
holding "Crime Victims Justice Reform Act," Proposition 115 on June 1990 pri-
mary ballot election); Calfarms Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal. 3d 805, 771 P.2d
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Thus, in its interpretation of the initiative single-subject
rule, the Perry court applied the canon of construction that
assumes the voters intended the judicial interpretation of the
previous legislative single-subject rule. While the opinion in
Perry is only one case of applying canons of similar construc-
tion to initiatives, the courts have repeatedly employed such
an analysis. 10
2
Use of such canons to interpret initiatives assumes
knowledge of the previous statute by the enacting body and
an intent for uniformity and consistency. This practice of ap-
plying the canon when analyzing an initiative, however, ig-
nores the limited knowledge of voters and the initiative as a
resource to alter the status quo.
III. ANALYsis
When California courts interpret initiatives by reference
to similar statutes, the court assumes that (1) the voter has
knowledge of the terms of the similar statute, knows the judi-
cial interpretations of the similar statute, and regards them
as definite, clear, and established;1"3 and (2) the initiative
carries with it a legislative desire for uniformity and consis-
tency with respect to similar statutes.104
The following analysis rejects the assumption that voters
act with knowledge of a previous similar statute, because vot-
ers are exposed to few sources for discovering the origin of
1247 (1989) (upholding insurance regulation initiative, Proposition 103 on No-
vember 1988 election ballot); Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274
(1982) (upholding "The Victim's Bill of Rights," Proposition 8 on the June 1982
primary election ballot); Fair Political Practices Comm. v. Superior Court, 25
Cal. 3d 33, 599 P.2d 46 (1979) (upholding Political Reform Act of 1974, Proposi-
tion 9 on the June 1974 ballot); Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281 (1978) (upholding the
Jarvis-Gann initiative, Proposition 13 on the June 1978 election ballot).
Two recent appellate court decisions, however, held initiatives violated the
single-subject rule. See Chemical Specialties Mfr. Ass'n v. Deukmejian, 227
Cal. App. 3d 663, 278 Cal. Rptr. 128 (Ct. App. 1991) (invalidating 1988 Proposi-
tion 105, the "Public's Right to Know Act"); California Trial Lawyers Ass'n v.
Eu, 200 Cal. App. 3d 351, 245 Cal. Rptr. 916 (Ct. App. 1988) (invalidating 1988
no-fault insurance measure). But see League of Women Voters v. Eu, 7 Cal.
App. 4th 649, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 416 (Ct. App. 1992) (upholding Government Ac-
countability and Taxpayer Protection Act of 1992).
102. See, e.g., Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 7 Cal. 4th 1, 23, 865
P.2d 633, 646 (1994); In re Harris, 49 Cal. 3d 131, 136, 775 P.2d 1057, 1060
(1989); In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 889, 694 P.2d 744, 754 (1985).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 54-59, 63-64.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 60-62.
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ballot language' ° 5 and because voters have little or no knowl-
edge of the judicial significance of initiative wording.10 6 Fur-
ther, the analysis demonstrates that the presumption for uni-
formity and consistency as applied to the initiative process is
inappropriate due to the initiative's role as an alternative leg-
islative body. 10
7
A. Knowledge of Statute's Wording and Construction
1. Voters' Minimal Exposure to Sources That Provide
the Origins of Borrowed Words
The California Supreme Court consistently deems the
electorate to "have voted intelligently upon an amendment to
their organic law, the whole text of which was supplied to
each of them prior to the election and which [we] must as-
sume [each of them] to have duly considered." s08 Assuming
the voters comprehend the purpose of a statute, however,
does not mean the court should assume voters are able to ad-
vance judgments on the origins of a word, phrase, or
sentence.
As previously discussed, an average voter has little time
to consider the purpose of an initiative, much less to study an
initiative's language. 1 9 Former Justice Manuel, dissenting
in Schmitz v. Younger," 0 acknowledged the need for a
stricter scrutiny of initiatives due to the differences in the
legislative arena:
[Tihe dangers presented by a multi-subject [initiative] are
much more limited in the legislative context than in the
initiative context. A proposed bill is closely scrutinized by
legislators and their staffs in both houses of the Legisla-
ture. Each bill is assigned to a standing committee that
receives testimony from interested parties and makes rec-
ommendations concerning the bill... the Governor exam-
105. See infra text accompanying notes 108-112.
106. See infra text accompanying notes 127-133.
107. See infra text accompanying notes 134-137.
108. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
22 Cal. 3d 208, 243-44, 583 P.2d 1281, 1298-99 (1978). In Raven, the court
stated that "[wle must assume the voters duly considered and comprehended"
the measure. Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 349, 801 P.2d 1077, 1085
(1990). In Brosnahan, the court stated that "[w]e should not... presume that
the voters did not know what they were about in approving Proposition 8."
Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 252, 651 P.2d 274, 283 (1982).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 30-43.
110. 21 Cal. 3d 90, 577 P.2d 652 (1978).
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ines the bill before signing it into law. By contrast, no
such scrutiny is afforded a proposed initiative by the
voter. 11
Voter exposure to initiatives is limited solely to official
materials presented in the ballot pamphlet, and judicial re-
view should reflect this." 2 Research revealed no pamphlet in
California or any other state where there is a discussion of
the origin of the borrowed words. Therefore, not only is it
probable that the electorate has no actual knowledge of the
genesis of or judicial significance of an initiative's language,
it is clear voters do not even have constructive knowledge of
an initiative language's significance. To assume the electo-
rate is aware of the origin or significance of complex, ambigu-
ous, and imprecise wording is unsound.
111. 21 Cal. 3d at 99, 577 P.2d at 657 (Manuel, J., dissenting).
112. Several commentators suggest courts look at materials not officially
presented to the voters to determine the voter knowledge and intent in initia-
tives. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 69, at 971 (advocating that a court look
at articles, books, television, radio programs, and past legislation to see if the
public was exposed to all the issues the initiative covered); Elizabeth A. McNel-
lie, Note, The Use of Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Popularly Enacted
Legislation, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 174, 176 (1989) (suggesting exit polls, me-
dia editorials, advertising, bumper stickers, and other potential devices to de-
termine the meaning of a popularly enacted statute). Indeed, the California
Supreme Court in Amador stated that "the advance publicity and public discus-
sion [of Proposition 13] and its predicted effects were massive. The measure
received as much public attention as any other ballot proposition in recent
years. These circumstances would seem to dilute the risk of voter confusion or
deception . . . ." Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 231, 583 P.2d 1281, 1291 (1978). Thus, such an
analysis may indicate that the California Supreme Court accepts information
other than that officially presented to the voter.
Incorporation of such information when interpreting initiatives, however,
is problematic. First, the analysis only speculates about what the public knows.
Under such an analysis, there is no certainty all voters were exposed to the
information the court uses to evaluate voter understanding. See supra note 38.
Second, such an analysis places a tremendous burden on the court to determine
which sources were influential in formulating voter understanding of an initia-
tive. Finally, looking at material extrinsic to that in the voter pamphlet opens
the door for proponents and opponents of initiatives to flood public discussion
with favorable information prior to the election.
As is discussed in this comment's proposal, a reviewing court should not
consider extrinsic sources and opinions of an initiative's meaning, but should
consider only materials officially presented in the voter pamphlet. While it may
be speculative to assume the voter's only source of information is the ballot
pamphlet, it is entirely unreliable to assume voters were exposed to media edi-
torials, television advertisements, and other extrinsic sources.
INTERPRETATION OF INITIATIVES
a. Application of The Canon Ignores Significance
of Initiative Wording
Another problem with applying a canon of similar con-
struction to initiatives is that the reviewing court focuses on
the previous judicial interpretation rather than on the words
and materials of the ballot pamphlet itself. Nowhere is this
clearer than the California Supreme Court's analysis in
Perry.
When interpreting by reference to a similar statute, it is
generally accepted that "'[w]here a statute, with reference to
one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such
provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject
is significant to show that a different intention existed.' "113
The Perry court ignored this significance when interpreting
the single-subject rule for initiatives. Had the court analyzed
the words of the initiative single-subject rule, rather than the
interpretation of the legislative single-subject rule, the court
may have found several significant differences.
First, the single-subject rule for initiatives does not re-
quire that the title state the measure's subject,1" 4 whereas
the single-subject rule for legislation does.1 1 5 The title re-
quirement in the legislative single-subject rule is a separate
inquiry for analysis of a legislative bill.' 16 In Perry, however,
the California Supreme Court analyzed the initiative's title
despite the fact the initiative did not require it to do so.1
7
Second, the "context" and "nature" of the initiative sin-
gle-subject rule embodied policies "subtly different" from the
legislative single-subject rule. 118 Because the main rationale
113. Committee of Seven Thousand v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. 3d 491, 507,
754 P.2d 708, 717-18 (1988) (quoting City of Port Huenne v. City of Oxnard, 52
Cal. 3d 385, 395, 341 P.2d 318, 324 (1959)). See also supra note 65 and accom-
panying text.
114. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d). See also supra text accompanying note
75. The original language of the initiative single-subject rule also omitted the
title requirement. See supra note 75.
115. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 9. See also supra text accompanying note 73.
116. See Harbor v. Deukmejian, 43 Cal. 3d 1078, 1096, 742 P.2d 1290, 1300
(1987) (stating the single-subject rule and title requirement are independent
provisions that serve separate purposes).
117. See Perry v. Jordan, 34 Cal. 2d 87, 94-95, 207 P.2d 46, 51 (1949). Such
a step demonstrates that the court may have been more concerned with harmo-
nizing the analysis of the initiative single-subject rule with that of the legisla-
tive single-subject rule, thereby ignoring the words of the initiative itself.
118. See supra text accompanying note 62.
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for the liberal review in Evans was not to impinge upon the
state legislature's prerogative," 9 the "nature" of the review
for initiatives is different, as there is no legislative preroga-
tive. In addition, the "context" of the enactment is different,
as the voters, unlike the legislature, did not have resources to
determine the legislative single-subject rule's interpretation.
Next, comparing the language of the initiative single-
subject rule with that of the legislative single-subject rule,
there is significance in the different wording. Besides the
omission of the title requirement, 120 the consequences for a
violation of the single-subject rules are different. A violation
of the initiative single-subject rule will invalidate the entire
initiative, 12 1 whereas a violation of the legislative single-sub-
ject rule will merely invalidate the part not encompassed by
the title.' 22 Together with the "context" and "nature" of the
enactment and the omission of the title requirement, the dif-
ferent language is likely enough to "show that a different in-
tention existed."
23
Finally, checking the different wording against the back-
drop of the materials in the voter pamphlet, it is clear there is
voter desire "not to be misled as to the overall effect of the
proposed amendment." 24 Indeed, the language of the ballot
pamphlet insinuates a review closer to that of the "strict" re-
view the court discussed in Wallace v. Zinman. 25 An objec-
tive examination of the text of the initiative and the ballot
pamphlet hardly reveals concerns akin to the legislative
prerogative. 126
In short, the court concluded that the liberal Evans re-
view applied, because it assumed that voters intended a stat-
ute similar to the legislative single-subject rule. Had the
court focused instead on the initiative language and the
materials officially presented to the voter, it may have
reached a different conclusion.
119. See supra text accompanying note 84.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 114-115.
121. 'An initiative measure embracing more than one subject may not...
have any effect." CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d).
122. "If a statute embraces a subject not expressed in its title, only the part
not expressed is void." CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 9.
123. See supra text accompanying note 113.
124. See 1948 BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 74, at 8.
125. See infra text accompanying notes 130-132.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 84-88.
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2. Failure of Court to Inquire Into Whether Voters Are
Reasonably Certain of the Judicial Significance
of Initiative Wording
The canons of interpretation by reference to similar stat-
utes are applied only when it is reasonably certain the enact-
ing body regards the interpretation of the similar statute by
the judiciary as definite, clear, and established. 127 When
courts skip the inquiry into how likely it is that an enacting
body views the similar words and their judicial interpretation
as established, the courts fail to account for the intent of the
legislating body. Again, the California Supreme Court's anal-
ysis in Perry demonstrates the problems of failing to inquire
whether the enacting body is reasonably certain of the origin
of the initiative's language.
The Perry court relied on the "indication" that if words
and phrases are used in a subsequent statute in a similar set-
ting, then the subsequent statute carries with it a like inter-
pretation. 128 The Perry court, however, failed to consider how
likely it was that voters contemplated the legislative single-
subject rule and its liberal "reasonably germane" test.129 The
failure to inquire into how likely it was that the voters knew
of the legislative single-subject rule and its interpretation in
Evans allowed the court to reach a conclusion it desired, re-
gardless of the language of the initiative and the materials in
the voter pamphlet.
127. See supra text accompanying note 64. Undoubtedly, the drafters of an
initiative will be familiar with any judicial significance a proposed initiative's
words may contain. California recognizes, however, that the drafter's knowl-
edge is irrelevant when interpreting the initiative.
Professor Lowenstein, in his article on the single-subject rule, contests that
the Perry court's analysis was correct because the drafter of the initiative in-
tended an interpretation akin to the legislative single-subject rule. Lowenstein,
supra note 69, at 949-53. As Lowenstein points out, Charles J. Conrad, the
Californian Assemblyman who drafted the language of the initiative single-sub-
ject rule, maintains that the single-subject rule was "directed at what was
known as 'catch-all' initiatives" and was not intended to sweep broadly. Charles
J. Conrad, Letter to the Editor, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1982, § II, at 10. As the
great weight of authority indicates, however, the motive or purpose of the draft-
ers is unreliable, because courts cannot state with assurance that the voters
were aware of the drafters' intent. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying
text. It is clear, therefore, that when interpreting the language of an initiative,
the court should inquire only into whether it is reasonably certain the voters
knew of the language's significance.
128. See supra text accompanying note 98.
129. See supra text accompanying note 98.
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For instance, the Perry court may just as easily have con-
cluded the voters intended strict compliance with the single-
subject rule pursuant to the rationale of Wallace v.
Zinman. 3 0 After all, Wallace previously addressed initia-
tives and the legislative single-subject rule. 131 In fact, the
wording of the Wallace holding is similar to the arguments in
the ballot pamphlet for the initiative single-subject rule.132
Therefore, without asking how reasonable it is that the elec-
torate knew of Wallace and the legislative single-subject rule,
the electorate could be charged with the knowledge of the
"strict compliance" test of Wallace, thus justifying the appli-
cation of a "strict" judicial review. The court's analysis in
Perry relies solely on the judge's subjective belief of voter
knowledge and fails to examine objective criteria. For this
reason, the analysis is an unreliable reflection of the enacting
body's intent.
It is crucial that a court ask how reasonable it is to as-
sume that the voters considered previous judicial interpreta-
tions of words borrowed from similar statutes. Otherwise,
the "paramount consideration" of the enacting body's intent is
never considered.' Rather, the approach is simply a subjec-
tive judicial belief of the intent of the initiative and does not
consider the actual materials a voter considered when study-
ing the initiative.
B. Uniformity, Consistency, and Initiatives
It has been said that "the need for uniformity becomes
more imperative where the same word or term is used in dif-
ferent statutory sections that are similar in purpose and con-
tent."134 Thus, a similar interpretation of the same term
used by the same legislature avoids "repugnancy" and "incon-
sistency." 36  Indeed, the reliability of legislative uniformity
is strongest when the same legislature enacts similar stat-
130. 200 Cal. 585, 254 P. 946 (1927). Wallace involved a challenge to an initi-
ative as violating the legislative single-subject rule. 200 Cal. at 590, 254 P. at
947. The challenge was prior to the enactment of the initiative single-subject
rule in 1948.
131. 200 Cal. at 589, 254 P. at 947.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
133. See Yoshisato v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 978, 989, 831 P.2d 327, 333-
34 (1992); see also supra text accompanying note 47.
134. 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 59, at 454.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 60-62.
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utes in the same session. 136 Desire for uniformity is perhaps
least convincing, however, when interpreting an initiative
based on prior legislative enactments.
Courts acknowledge that the initiative process in Califor-
nia is the "legislative battering ram which may be used to
tear through the exasperating tangle of the traditional legis-
lative procedure and strike directly toward the desired
end. " 137 Most initiatives are a response to the failure or re-
fusal of the legislature to act in a given area. Indeed, legisla-
tive inaction is the reason the initiative process was
established.
Therefore, to imply voter intent to harmonize existing
legislation with the initiative ignores the reason the initiative
was submitted for public consideration in the first place.
While canons interpreting subsequent enactments by the
same legislature rightly presume desire for uniformity, the
"need for uniformity" becomes less imperative when inter-
preting initiatives. Thus, the two primary considerations
upon which the canons of similar construction rest-the en-
acting body had knowledge of the law and desired uniformity
in the interpretation-are not served in the initiative
context.
IV. PROPOSAL: INTERPRET INITIATIVES WITH MATERIALS
PRESENTED TO THE VOTERS IN THE BALLOT
PAMPHLET
As this comment has attempted to demonstrate, there is
no evidence that voters come to the ballot box armed with
knowledge of an initiative's wording and its judicial signifi-
cance. Rather, it appears that the voter is often overwhelmed
by the many proposals on the ballot and may grasp only the
initiative's general purpose as described in the ballot argu-
ment. Thus, this comment contends that the only reliable
source for interpretation of initiative language, other than its
common meaning, is the material presented to all voters in
the voter pamphlet prior to the election.
Justice Frankfurter, faced with problems of statutory in-
terpretation, stated that "the answers to the problems" of in-
136. See supra note 55.
137. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
22 Cal. 3d 208, 228, 583 P.2d 1281, 1289 (1978).
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"1138terpretation "are in its exercise. Similarly, problems of in-
terpretation of initiatives when applying a canon of similar
construction are solved by a refined and reliable method of
analysis. Thus, this comment proposes that, in its "exercise"
of interpreting initiatives, a court should consider the materi-
als the voters have considered themselves. The voter is the
law-maker; the drafter and proponents of the initiative are
not. The court must not assume the voter has great insight
into the initiative's words or into the prior construction of an-
other statute. Courts must remember the context in which
the initiative is presented to the voter-a long and foreign
piece of legislation whittled down to a "yes" or "no" vote.
Careful scrutiny of the language of an initiative against the
backdrop of the materials in the voter pamphlet is likely to
lend a better understanding of the meaning of the initiative
than reference to a similar statute.
Many may be quick to point out that the problem is not
that it makes sense for courts to assume voter knowledge of
other statutes or interpretations of words. The real problem
is how a court must apply "voter intent" to some technical
legal issue nobody thought about before the law was passed.
Indeed, given the lack of knowledge of voters and the
campaigning practices of those backing initiatives, how can
we say those who said "yes" to an initiative all had one com-
mon idea of what a law was meant to do? For this reason,
why shouldn't courts look to the drafters of an initiative and
their intent-after all, can't the initiative process be seen as
the special interests taking their case to the people?
Indeed, it would be simplistic to suppose that courts
could apply "voter intent" to a technical legal issue not previ-
ously considered by the electorate. It would also be disingen-
uous, however, to disregard what the voters did consider-
especially when applying canons of similar construction. The
initiative is the most powerful type of law in California, and
to look to the drafter's belief regarding how a law operates
ignores what basis the electorate had to agree or disagree
with that interpretation. The initiative process remains im-
portant to the citizens of California because the initiative
sponsors take their case to the people and the people decide.
As such, courts should demand that voters be reasonably cer-
138. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
COLUM. L. REV. 527, 530 (1947).
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tain of other statutes or interpretations of words before ap-
plying canons of similar construction. In addition, when
courts find difficulty with technical legal issues, they should
consult the stated purpose of an initiative in the ballot argu-
ment or the initiative language-not information withheld by
the initiative sponsor.
There are some who also may argue that removing a
prior statute's construction from consideration of an ambigu-
ous initiative will give judges an invitation to approach statu-
tory construction without any standards to guide them. The
argument, however, ignores the choice the judge has when
applying the construction in the first place. As Judge Posner
stated:
By making statutory interpretation seem mechanical
rather than creative, the canons conceal, often from the
reader of the judicial opinion and sometimes from the
writer, the extent to which the judge is making new law in
the guise of interpreting a statute or a constitutional pro-
vision .... The judge who recognizes the degree to which
he is free rather than constrained in the interpretation of
statutes, and who refuses to make a pretense of constraint
by parading the canons of construction in his opinions, is
less likely to act willfully than the judge who either mis-
takes freedom for constraint or has no compunctions
about misrepresenting his will as that of the [enacting
body]. 13 9
Thus, the application of a similar statute's interpretation
may actually delegate more legislative power to a judge than
would be the case if a court were confined to the study of the
language of the initiative and its supporting ballot materials.
Another potential criticism of the interpretation of initia-
tives solely by reference to materials presented to the voters
in the ballot pamphlet is that the reviewing court may en-
force the words of an initiative rigidly, thereby limiting the
initiative's desired application. This comment, however, does
not suggest that interpretation of initiatives be rigid and thus
prohibit the sovereign people from either expressing or imple-
menting their own will. Rather, the interpreting court should
"jealously guard"140 the right to initiative by rejecting sources
139. POSNER, supra note 66, at 816-17.
140. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
22 Cal. 3d 208, 248, 583 P.2d 1281, 1302 (1978).
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not considered by voters. This will not foster judicial activ-
ism or subvert the public will; it will, however, authenticate
the law-making process. In addition, refusing to accept the
drafter's knowledge of an earlier statute when interpreting
initiatives encourages initiative sponsors to disclose to voters
the source of initiative language. On the other hand, inter-
preting initiatives via canons of similar construction may en-
courage the drafters to hide the significance of language that
voters would interpret differently than the courts.
Thus, courts should, whenever possible, return the initia-
tive process to the voters by considering solely those materi-
als presented to voters in the ballot pamphlet to interpret ini-
tiative measures.
V. CONCLUSION
This comment argues that the assumption of voter
knowledge of existing laws and their judicial constructions
weakens the initiative process. California courts are willing
to use existing statutes and their judicial construction to re-
solve ambiguities in initiatives. The comment demonstrates
that voters generally have no exposure to the sources that
serve as the origin of the initiative's wording, that there is no
reasonable certainty the voters considered the judicial signifi-
cance of the borrowed words, and that the primary reasons
for utilizing canons of similar construction are not served in
the review of initiatives. For the reasons set forth, courts
should limit interpretation of initiative language to materials
officially presented to the voters in the ballot pamphlet.
Stephen H. Sutro
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